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Abstract This paper is a contribution to the theory of focus; in particular, it is con-
cerned with what counts as a valid focus alternative. Empirical data from contrastive
negation associating with presupposition triggers is presented, and it is observed
that association with the definite article and both lead to an existence inference. It is
shown that the existence inference is unexplained by the current theory of focus, but
that it can be explained by placing constraints on focus alternatives. The constraints
I propose are that focus alternatives are limited to the meanings of linguistic expres-
sions that satisfy one of two novel notions of equivalence: Strawson-equivalence
or P-equivalence. Strawson-equivalence is the bidirectional variant of von Fintel’s
(1999) Strawson-entailment, and P-entailment holds between two expressions which
have equivalent presuppositions.
Keywords: negation, presupposition, focus, alternatives, quantifiers, Strawson-entailment,
Strawson-equivalence, P-equivalence
1 Introduction
This paper presents novel data on contrastive negation to motivate a more con-
strained theory of focus alternatives. The main empirical contribution is this: it
is observed that when the definite article associates with negation, its uniqueness
presupposition can be denied, but its existence presupposition cannot. Similarly,
when both associates with negation, an analogous existential inference is perceived.
This behavior can be explained if focus alternatives are limited to the meanings of
lexical expressions that satisfy one of two (somewhat) novel semantic conditions:
Strawson-equivalence or P-equivalence. Strawson-equivalence (inspired by von
Fintel’s (1999) Strawson-entailment) holds between two semantic objects that recur-
sively Strawson-entail each other. P-equivalence holds between two semantic objects
which recursively have equivalent presuppositions. By using these two notions to
* This paper benefited greatly from discussions with Bernhard Schwarz, Luis Alonso-Ovalle, Michael
Wagner, and Brendan Gillon. Previous versions of this paper were also presented at the Semantics
Research Group at McGill University and at the Toronto-Ottawa-Montreal Semantics Workshop
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characterize focus alternatives, one can explain the behavior of the definite article
and both under association with negation.
This paper is organized as follows. Our crucial observations regarding asso-
ciation with the definite article are reported in §2, which includes observations
regarding other presupposition triggers. §3 presents the basic theoretical treatment
of contrastive negation that is assumed here. §4 further develops the base theory to
handle association with presupposition triggers in general, and §5 shows that this
theory makes wrong predictions when applied to the definite article. §6 develops
the proposal. §6.1 defines Strawson-equivalence and §6.2 shows how Strawson-
alternatives can be fruitfully applied to association with the definite article. §6.3
presents observations on both and finally §6.4 defines P-equivalence and shows how
P-alternatives can be applied to association with both.
2 Observations
Contrastive negation (or association with negation) describes a negated sentence
containing a focus-marked constituent. In terms of its meaning, a contrastively
negated sentence contrasts the negated sentence with some other sentence formed
by replacing the focus marked item with something else. A simple example, taken
from Beaver & Clark 2009, is shown in (1).1 Compare (1) with (2).
(1) a. Kim doesn’t study LINGUISTICS at Northwestern.
b. Kim doesn’t study linguistics at NORTHWESTERN.
(2) Kim doesn’t study linguistics at Northwestern.
Focus marking affects the sentence’s felicity conditions. (2) is true and felicitous
in any world where it is not the case that Kim studies linguistics in Northwestern.
But (1a) is only true and felicitous in a world where both (2) holds and Kim studies
something else at Northwestern.
Contrastive negation also affects the felicity conditions of presupposed content.
When a presupposition trigger associates with negation, as in (3), it is felicitous to
deny the presupposed content.
(3) a. Jimi isn’t bringing BOTH his guitars, he has three guitars.
b. Chris didn’t KNOW that Hillary was going to win the election; in fact, she
didn’t.
1 The examples in (1), as well as all other examples in this paper, should be read with the rise fall
rise (RFR) contour (Pierrehumbert & Steele 1989), also known as the B-accent (Jackendoff 1972).
According to Beaver & Clark 2009, this is the intonation that is most commonly associated with
contrastive negation. Other intonations may have other interpretations, and are not discussed here;
see Beaver & Clark 2009 for an overview of the different intonations and their interpretations.
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c. Emilia isn’t coming to Montréal AGAIN, this is the first time she’s coming.
The continuations in each of these three sentences make it clear that the presup-
position triggered by the focus marked item is false, where those presupposition are
listed informally in (4).
(4) a. JbothK(P)(Q) presupposes |P|= 2.
b. JknowK(p)(x) presupposes p is true.
c. JagainK(p) presupposes p occurred in the past.
Now, consider a case where definite article associates with negation. In the classic
analysis (Frege 1892; Strawson 1950), the definite article presupposes existence and
uniqueness. One way to state this is in (5).2
(5) JtheK(P)(Q) presupposes
a. Existence. P 6= /0, and
b. Uniqueness. |P| ≤ 1.
Together this amounts to the presupposition that |P|= 1.
(6-8) shows that when the definite article associates with negation, the uniqueness
presupposition can be denied, but not the existence presupposition.
(6) a. Jake isn’t THE student who failed the midterm, many students failed.
b. # Jake isn’t THE student who failed the midterm, no one failed.
(7) a. Sam didn’t invite THE syntax professor at McGill, he invited A syntax
professor.
b. # Sam didn’t invite THE syntax professor at McGill, he didn’t invite any
syntax professors.
(8) a. Sam didn’t invite THE syntax professor at McGill, there are three syntax
professors at McGill.
b. # Sam didn’t invite THE syntax professor at McGill, there no syntax
professors at McGill.
In (6), the relevant presupposed content is that there exist students (existence) and
that there is at most one student (uniqueness). (6a) shows that if many students failed
the exam, then contrastively negating the definite is felicitous; this is the situation in
which the uniqueness presupposition is false. (6b) shows that if no one failed the
2 Here, the definite article is analyzed as a quantificational determiner (Barwise & Cooper 1981) instead
of a function from predicates to entities in order to capture a similarity between the definite article
and both, which is presented in §6.3.
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exam, then contrastively negating the definite is not felicitous; this is the situation
in which the existence presupposition is false. (7-8) show the same phenomenon in
argument position. (7) shows that contrastively negating the definite is compatible
with a continuation that replaces the definite with the indefinite, but not compatible
with a continuation that replaces it with not . . . any. Furthermore, uttering (7a) gives
rise to the inference that Sam invited multiple syntax professors, and hence that there
are multiple syntax professors, denying the uniqueness presupposition. (8) shows
the same facts as (7) with continuations that directly deny either the existence or
uniqueness presupposition.
The contrasts in (6-8) present a puzzle for the semantics of contrastive negation.
If contrastive negation can deny presuppositions, how do we explain the contrast
between the uniqueness-denying examples (the (a) examples) and the infelicitous
existence-denying examples (the (b) examples)? In more general terms, why does
association with the definite article always lead to an existence inference?
(9) Puzzle. Negation associating with the definite article invariably leads to
an existence inference, in which the existence of the restrictor of JtheK is
inferred.
The remainder of this paper is dedicated to solving this puzzle.
3 Theoretical background
Let us adopt the focus-based analysis of contrastive negation in Beaver & Clark
2009 (see also Jackendoff 1972) using the notation for focus contributed by Rooth
1992 (I will refer to this as the Beaver-Clark-Rooth theory of contrastive negation).
Rooth 1992 defines the focus alternative set (J·K f ) and the focus operator (∼) which
is defined in terms of focus alternative sets. To differentiate the focus alternative
set JSK f of an utterance S from the ordinary meaning of S, Rooth uses JSKo for the
ordinary meaning of S. Definitions of these two notions are given in (10).
(10) a. Focus alternative set. JSK f is the set of all semantic objects φ such that φ
is obtained from JSKo by replacing the interpretation of every focus marked
item XF in S with any semantic object of the same type as JXFKo.
b. Focus operator. J[∼ S]Ko asserts JSKo and presupposes ∃ψ ∈ JSK f [ψ 6=JSKo∧ψ].
The focus operator is a purely presuppositional operator: it contributes nothing
to the asserted content, but contributes the focus presupposition which states that
there is some true alternative in the focus alternative set of its argument.3
3 Note that our formulation of the focus operator includes the disputed existential presupposition: the
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A contrastively negated sentence has an LF where ∼ scopes below negation.4
For example, (1a) has the LF (11a). Its focus alternative set is (11b). Given the
definition of the focus operator, its interpretation is (11c). In (11c), the asserted
content is just the ordinary interpretation of (11a), and the presupposed content is
the focus presupposition, which states that there is some true alternative in the focus
set. In this example, the focus presupposition is equivalent to stating that there is
some x other than linguistics that Kim studies at Northwestern; this is what is written
in (11c-ii)
(11) a. [not [∼ [Kim studies [linguistics]F at Northwestern]]]
b. {study-at(k,x,northwestern) : x ∈ De}
c. J(11a)Ko =
i. Assertion. ¬study-at(k, ling,northwestern)
ii. Presupposition. ∃x ∈ De[study-at(k,x,northwestern)∧ x 6= ling]
4 Association with presupposition triggers
We saw in §2 that contrastive negation can deny presuppositions. The analysis of
contrastive negation laid out in §3 cannot capture this property. If ∼ scopes over a
sentence which has a presupposition, that presupposition will project through ∼ and
proceed to project through negation, since negation is a hole (Karttunen 1973).
To allow contrastively negated sentences to deny presuppositions, Beaver &
Krahmer’s (2001) assertion operator is used.5 The assertion operator is defined by
the truth table in (12).6
content which states that the alternative ψ is true. It is disputed whether the existential presupposition
should be part of the semantics of focus (see e.g. Rooth 1999 for arguments against the existential
presupposition). However, it is clear that contrastively negated sentences have the inference that
there is a true alternative. The existential presupposition is included as an easy way to capture this
inference, though the content of this paper should be compatible with other ways of capturing this
inference.
4 This is the preferred scope ordering given in Beaver & Clark 2009 for association with negation
under the RFR intonation. Other intonations prefer the opposite scope ordering, but those are outside
the scope of this paper.
5 The notion of an operator with the truth conditions of the assertion operator goes back to Bochvar’s
(1938) truth operator.
6 Following the formalization in Beaver & Krahmer 2001, a trivalent logic is assumed; the set of truth
values is {0,1,#}, where presupposition failure is treated as the # truth value. Negation is a hole for
presuppositions (Karttunen 1973), so it has the truth table in (i).
(i) Negation in a trivalent logic.
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(12) Assertion operator.
A
1 1
0 0
# 0
When A scopes below negation, it can be used as a “presupposition wipe-out
device”. The general effect of A is that it shifts presupposed content into asserted
content, so that if pq presupposes q and asserts p, then A(pq)≡ (p∧q).7 Then, if
negation scopes over A, the presupposed content can be denied. In other words, we
have that ¬A(pq)≡ ¬(p∧q), so ¬A(pq) can be made true if q is false.
An example is shown in (13), in which the sentence Jacques didn’t invite the
king of France is interpreted with the LF (13a).8 In the actual world, Jacques invited
the king of France is a presupposition failure, since France is a republic. But A
converts # into the truth value 0, which negation flips to 1, so the whole proposition
is true. In other words, A(p) is true if p = 1, and false if p 6= 1. In our example,
p = JJacques invited the king of FranceKo = #, so p 6= 1; hence, ¬A(p) is true. This
is what is stated in (13b).
(13) a. [not [A [Jacques invited the king of France]]]
b. ¬(A(JJacques invited the king of FranceKo))
≡ ¬(JJacques invited the king of FranceKo = 1)
≡ JJacques invited the king of FranceKo 6= 1
The A-operator can be combined with the focus operator to capture the behavior
of negation associating with presupposition triggers. This is illustrated with example
(3b), repeated in (14).
(14) Chris didn’t KNOW that Hillary was going to win the election (, because she
didn’t).
¬
1 0
0 1
# #
7 Technically, in the logic defined by Beaver & Krahmer 2001, A(pq)≡ Ap∧Aq. This is due to the fact
that their formalism allows p and q to have presuppositions themselves. In the informal presentation
here, assume that p and q are not presuppositional themselves, in which case the equivalence in the
body of this paper holds.
8 In the interest of a cleaner presentation, the symbol A is used in both our meta-language and object
language (i.e., in both the LF and its meaning).
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(14) should be true in a world where Hillary didn’t win the election. Furthermore,
with its continution (14) intuitively has the implication that Chris merely believed
that Hillary was going to win. This reading can be generated by the LF in (15a),
where A scopes below both negation and the focus operator. Its focus alternative set
is (15b) and its interpretation is (15c).9
(15) a. [not [∼ [A [Chris [knew]F that Hillary was going to win]]]]]
b. {P(λw′.winw′(h))(c) : P ∈ D〈〈e,〈s,t〉〉,〈s,t〉〉}
c. i. Assertion. JknowKo(λw′.winw′(h))(c)(w0) 6= 1
ii. Presupposition. ∃P[P(λw′.winw′(h))(c)(w0)∧P 6= JknowKo]
If Hillary didn’t win, then the assertion in (15c) is true, thanks to the contribution
of the A operator. Furthermore, the focus presupposition states that there is some
alternative propositional functorP that relates Chris and the proposition that Hillary
was going to win. Clearly, in this context, the relevant alternative propositional
functor is JbelieveKo, which lacks the factive presupposition of JknowKo.
5 Association with the definite article
This section revisits the crucial case of negation associating with the definite article.
The analysis developed in the last section is applied to this case, and it is shown that
the analysis makes the incorrect prediction; it does not predict any of the contrasts
observed in §2.
Let us take (7) as our running example, repeated in (16).
(16) Sam didn’t invite THE syntax professor,
a. . . . he invited A syntax professor.
b. # . . . he didn’t invite any syntax professors.
Assume that the definite article has an entry like in (17).10 If (16) has the LF in
(18a), its interpretation is (18b).
9 Note that in (15b), the focus alternatives are each within the scope of A. The presence of A makes no
difference here, since A does not embed negation, nor any other holes or filters for presuppositions. If
p contains no holes or filters, then Ap has the same truth conditions as p, in the sense that Ap = 1 iff
p = 1.
Note also that in (15c) the world parameter is included since it is relevant for the meaning of
know. In the rest of this paper, world parameters are generally not included so as to not clutter the
notation.
10 Set-notation is used as a shorthand for formulas in predicate logic: (i) P 6= /0 is short for ∃x[P(x)], (ii)
|P| ≤ 1 is short for ∀x[P(x)→∀y[P(y)→ x = y]], (iii) P⊆ Q is short for ∀x[P(x)→ Q(x)].
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(17) JtheKo(P)(Q) :={P⊆ Q if P 6= /0∧|P| ≤ 1
# otherwise
(18) a. [not [∼ [A [Sam invited [the]F syntax professor]]]]
b. i. Assertion. JtheKo(λx.prof(x))(λx.invite(s,x)) 6= 1
ii. Presupposition. ∃δ [δ (λx.prof(x))(λx.invite(s,x))∧δ 6= JtheKo]
(18b) asserts that the ordinary interpretation of Sam invited the syntax professor
is not true, so it is either false or a presupposition failure. (18b) presupposes that
there is some other determiner meaning that can replace JtheKo that leads to a true
proposition.
One determiner meaning that could replace JtheKo is JaKo, giving the alternativeJSam invited a syntax professorKo. This correctly predicts that (16a) is felicitous,
since the continuation in (16a) is identical to an existing focus alternative. This
also predicts that (8a) is felicitous, since the continuation is compatible with an
existing focus alternative. Another determiner meaning that could replace JtheKo isJnoKo, giving the alternative JSam invited no syntax professorKo. Here, we run into a
problem: this incorrectly predicts that (16b) is felicitous, since this focus alternative
is compatible with the continuation in (16b). This also incorrectly predicts that (8b)
is felicitous, for the same reason.
This problem is the one we set out to solve. The base theory does not give
the right predictions for association with the definite article because the definite’s
focus alternative set contains items like JnoKo which lead to focus alternatives that
correspond with infelicitous interpretations.
In more general terms, here is a summary of the analysis thus far. We observed
that when contrastive negation associates with a presupposition trigger, the presup-
position can be denied. This was modelled by combining the Beaver-Clark-Rooth
theory with Beaver & Krahmer’s assertion operator. We crucially observed that when
contrastive negation associates with the definite article, the definite presupposition
can still be denied, but an existence inference remains. To capture this, we seek an
analysis which generates an existence inference in those cases. The Beaver-Clark-
Rooth theory fails at this task, because there are alternatives in the focus alternative
set associated with the definite article which do not entail existence of their restrictor
(like JnoKo).
Our solution, presented in §6, is to constrain the set of focus alternatives, so
that alternatives like JnoKo are ruled out, but alternatives like JaKo remain. §6 shows
how to define a few general constraints which are capable of deriving a suitable
focus alternative set for the definite article. These constraints are formulated in terms
of two notions – Strawson-equivalence and P-equivalence – to be defined below.
Then, it is shown how the proposed theory extends to other examples of contrastive
negation.
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6 Constraints on alternatives
6.1 Strawson-equivalence
A constrained theory of alternatives must at the very least exclude JnoKo from JtheK f .
On the other hand, it would be safe to include JaKo in JtheK f . Notice that JtheKo andJaKo share a curious property that JtheKo and JnoKo do not. If the presupposition
triggered by JtheKo is taken for granted, then any sentence containing JtheKo is se-
mantically equivalent to that same sentence containing JaKo. For example, if there is
a unique queen of England, then JNigel invited the queen of EnglandKo entails thatJNigel invited a queen of EnglandKo; furthermore, since there is at most one queen of
England, JNigel invited a queen of EnglandKo entails that JNigel invited the queen of
EnglandKo. This property does not hold between JtheKo and JnoKo, since these two en-
tries are actually contradictory. For example, JNigel invited the queen of EnglandKo
contradicts JNigel invited no queen of EnglandKo
This property is called Strawson-equivalence. To define it, first define the notion
of Strawson-entailment, originally contributed by von Fintel 1999, given in (19)
(where→ is material implication).
(19) Strawson-entailment.
Let p,q be expressions of type 〈s, t〉. Then p S=⇒ q iff for every w ∈ Ds such
that q(w) 6= #, p(w)→ q(w).
It will be useful to talk about Strawson-entailment holding between lexical items,
not just propositions. To that end, (21) extends the notion of Strawson-entailment to
all types which end in 〈s, t〉.11
(20) For any type τ , define the notion ends in τ recursively:
a. τ ends in τ .
b. 〈σ ,σ ′〉 ends in τ if σ ′ ends in τ .
(21) Cross-categorical Strawson-entailment.
Let f ,g be expressions of type 〈σ ,τ〉 where τ ends in 〈s, t〉. Then f S=⇒ g iff
for every x ∈ Dσ such that g(x) 6= #, f (x) S=⇒ g(x).
Finally, define Strawson-equivalence as bidirectional Strawson-entailment.
(22) Strawson-equivalence. Let f ,g be expressions of type τ which ends in 〈s, t〉.
Then f S⇐⇒ g iff f S=⇒ g and g S=⇒ f .
11 Von Fintel does not define Strawson-entailment recursively in this way, so there are some cases in
which the two definitions diverge. The notion of Strawson-entailment defined here resembles the
notion of ST=⇒-entailment defined in Sharvit 2017, though is not exactly the same.
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It can be easily proven that JtheKo is Strawson-equivalent to JaKo, but that JtheKo
is not Strawson-equivalent to JnoKo, assuming the lexical entries in (23a,23b).
(23) a. JaKo(P)(Q) := P∩Q 6= /0
b. JnoKo(P)(Q) := P∩Q = /0
(24) Proposition.
a. JtheKo S⇐⇒ JaKo
b. JtheKo 6 S⇐⇒ JnoKo
6.2 Strawson-alternatives
Define the Strawson-alternatives of α as the items Strawson-equivalent to α .
(25) Strawson-alternatives. AS(α) := {γ : α S⇐⇒ γ}
As a first step, let us hypothesize that focus alternatives are Strawson-alternatives.
(26) Hypothesis 1. For any F-marked constituent [X ]F , JXK f := AS(JXKo).
Given proposition (24), JnoKo is no longer a member of JtheK f , but JaKo is.
Assuming that the focus alternative set for a whole proposition is constructed recur-
sively from the alternative sets of lexical items via piece-wise composition (as in
Rooth 1996), the focus alternatives for any sentence with an F-marked the cannot be
constructed by replacing the with no, as desired.
In general, JtheK f should include only those semantic objects which guarantee
existence. More precisely, JtheK f should only include expressions δ such that
δ (P)(Q) guarantees P 6= /0. At this point, our hypothesized focus alternative set is
still not constrained enough to guarantee this; it still admits alternatives which do
not guarantee existence in this way.
Problem: Arbitrary non-linguistic alternatives. It is easy to formulate arbitrary
semantic objects that are Strawson-equivalent to JtheK but do not guarantee existence.
Consider the expression in (27).
(27) the′(P)(Q) :=
{
P⊆ Q if |P| ≤ 1
# otherwise
the′ is just like JtheKo, except it lacks the existence presupposition. There is
no linguistic expression in English which has the meaning of the′, but it is easily
formulable using predicate logic (abbreviated as set theory) as a lambda-expression
of the same type as JtheKo. Since focus alternatives are stated upon semantic objects,
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the′ can be considered as an alternative. It is easy to see that the′ is Strawson-
equivalent to the, but the′(P)(Q) does not guarantee that P 6= /0.
In fact, there are an infinite amount of expressions which are Strawson-equivalent
to JtheKo but do not guarantee existence. Any function δn, for any n ∈N, of the form
δn(P)(Q) :=
{
P⊆ Q if |P| ≤ n
# otherwise
is Strawson-equivalent to JtheKo but does not guarantee existence for P.
To solve this problem, notice that neither the′ nor any of the δn’s correspond
to linguistic expressions. This suggests that our alternatives should be restricted
to linguistic expressions, a conclusion which was also reached by Fox & Katzir
2011 for entirely different reasons. There are many ways to implement this idea;
one solution, which minimally alters the first hypothesis, is formulated in (28).
Here, it is assumed that J·Ko has already been defined as function from linguistic
expressions (actually LFs generated by some grammar) to type-theoretic objects.
By restricting alternatives to items of the form JyKo where y ∈ dom(J·Ko), JyKo is
implicitly restricted to meanings of linguistic expressions.
(28) Hypothesis 2. For any F-marked constituent [X ]F , JXK f := {JyKo : JyKo ∈
AS(JXKo),y ∈ dom(J·Ko)}.
Result. After imposing these constraints, let us see what the resulting set of
alternatives for the definite article looks like. Since our alternatives are limited to the
meanings of linguistic expressions, let us delineate the set of English quantificational
determiners that our alternatives draw from. Let us be generous about what is
considered a quantificational determiner and assume that they include all and only
these: some/a, every/all, no/none, both, neither/either, at least n, exactly n, the (n),
not all, at most n, fewer than n, and most. Assume also that these determiners have
the interpretations assigned to them by Barwise & Cooper 1981, except that I follow
De Jong & Verkuyl 1985 in assuming that every and all presuppose existence, as in
(29) (originally suggested by Strawson 1950).
(29) Jevery/allKo(P)(Q) :={P⊆ Q if P 6= /0
# otherwise
With these assumptions, the set of alternatives to the are the expressions listed in
(30).12
12 JallKo and JsomeKo are not shown since they are assumed to be respectively semantically equivalent
to JeveryKo and JaKo. Since this is a set, duplicates are not allowed.
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(30) JtheK f = {JeveryKo,JaKo,JmostKo,JtheKo,JbothKo,Jexactly 1Ko,JneitherKo,Jthe 2Ko,Jthe 3Ko, . . .}
The set in (30) has two notable properties, one is desirable and the other is
potentially problematic. First, the desired property that (30) has is that all of these al-
ternatives guarantee existence. JeveryKo, JmostKo, JbothKo, JneitherKo, and Jthe (n)Ko
presuppose that their first argument is non-empty, while JaKo and Jexactly 1Ko entail
that their first argument is non-empty.
Second, the problematic property is that (30) contains the alternative JneitherKo.
This predicts that (31) should be felicitous, though I find it quite strange.
(31) ?? Sam didn’t invite THE syntax professor, he invited neither of them.
If (31) is indeed infelicitous, then JneitherKo should be excluded from JtheK f .
Let us examine why JneitherKo is a valid focus alternative, i.e., why it is Strawson-
equivalent to JtheKo. JneitherKo(P)(Q) presupposes that |P| = 2, which contra-
dicts the presupposition of JtheKo(P)(Q), which presupposes that |P| = 1. These
two lexical items end up Strawson-entailing each other because the base case of
Strawson-entailment is material implication. If we apply the definition of Strawson-
equivalence to JtheKo and JneitherKo, shown in (32), we can see that the contradictory
presuppositions cause the antecedent to be false, making the material conditional
true. One can easily check that the same occurs in the opposite direction, makingJtheKo and JneitherKo Strawson-equivalent.
(32) JtheKo(P)(Q) S=⇒ JneitherKo(P)(Q) iff P⊆Q∧|P|= 1∧|P|= 2→ P∩Q= /0.
In fact, if two expressions have contradictory presuppositions, they will always
Strawson-entail each other. This is also the reason why JbothKo and Jthe nKo for
n > 1 are listed as valid focus alternatives.
Given that (31) is infelicitous, I take the view that this case is an undesirable edge
case of Strawson-entailment that should be excluded from the focus alternatives. To
do so, hypothesis 2 is altered as follows:
(33) Hypothesis 3. For any F-marked constituent [X ]F , JXK f := {JyKo : JyKo ∈
AS(JXKo),y ∈ dom(J·Ko),presupp(JyKo) does not contradict presupp(JXKo)}.
To summarize, it was observed that association with presupposition triggers
could deny their presuppositions, but that association with definites still preserved
the existence presupposition. It was shown that this behavior can be explained if
the focus alternatives for the definite article are constrained to Strawson-equivalent
linguistic items with non-contradictory presuppositions. Given such a constraint,
the set of focus alternatives is restricted just to those determiner meanings which
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preserve existence on their first argument. As a result, the definite’s existence
presupposition cannot be false. This derives the contrasts observed in §2.
6.3 Association with both
This section presents evidence that hypothesis 3 is in fact too tightly constrained.
In §6.4, I propose to weaken it by allowing alternatives to be either Strawson-
alternatives or P-alternatives, a notion to be defined shortly.
Consider association with both. (34) shows that association with both shares a
property with association with the definite article: when negated, existence cannot
be denied.
(34) a. Jimi isn’t bringing BOTH guitars, he has three
b. # Jimi isn’t bringing BOTH guitars, he has no guitars
The explanation given for the definite extends to this case. The set of linguistic
items Strawson-equivalent to JbothKo (its focus alternatives under hypothesis 3) are
given in (35).
(35) JbothKo, JeveryKo, Jat least twoKo, Jexactly twoKo
All of the expressions in (35) preserve existence: JbothKo and JeveryKo presup-
pose existence for their first argument, and Jat least twoKo and Jexactly twoKo entail
existence for both arguments. If hypothesis 3 is right and (35) is the set of focus
alternatives for both, then the contrast in (34) is explained analogously to the definite
case.
However, the alternatives in (35) cannot account for (36), which is perfectly
felicitous.
(36) Jimi isn’t bringing BOTH guitars
a. . . . he isn’t bringing EITHER of them.
b. . . . he’s bringing NEITHER of them.
It is clear that both continuations in (36) contrast JbothKo with JneitherKo.13
But JneitherKo does not show up in (35) and none of the alternatives in (35) are
compatible with JneitherKo. As a result, hypothesis 3 incorrectly predicts that (36)
should be a presupposition failure.
13 Assume, for simplicity, that JneitherK = Jnot . . . eitherK.
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6.4 P-equivalence and P-alternatives
We wish to find a way to include JneitherKo into the set of focus alternatives for
both. Notice that JbothKo and JneitherKo have a property in common. Assuming the
entries in (37), their presuppositions are equivalent.
(37) a. JbothKo(P)(Q) :={P⊆ Q if |P|= 2
# otherwise
b. JneitherKo(P)(Q) :={P∩Q = /0 if |P|= 2
# otherwise
Call this property P-equivalence and define it recursively in (38). Say thatJbothKo is P-equivalent to JneitherKo (and vice-versa), written in (39).
(38) P-equivalence.
a. (Base case) Let p,q be expressions of type 〈s, t〉. Then p P⇐⇒ q iff for all
w ∈ Ds, p(w) = # iff q(w) = #.
b. (Inductive case) Let f ,g be expressions of type 〈σ ,τ〉 where τ ends in
t. Then f P⇐⇒ g iff for all x ∈ Dσ , (i) f (x) = # iff g(x) = #, and (ii)
f (x) P⇐⇒ g(x).
(39) Proposition. JbothKo P⇐⇒ JneitherKo
Then, alter the previous hypothesis by allowing alternatives to be either Strawson-
equivalent or P-equivalent. This is the final formulation.
(40) P-alternatives. AP(α) := {γ : α P⇐⇒ γ}
(41) Final Hypothesis. For any F-marked constituent [X ]F ,JXK f := {JyKo : JyKo ∈ AS(JXKo)∪AP(JXKo),y ∈ dom(J·Ko),presupp(JyKo)
does not contradict presupp(JXKo)}
As a result, JneitherKo is now included as a possible focus alternative for JbothKo.
Now, (36) corresponds to a valid focus alternative, so it is no longer a presupposition
failure, as desired.
To address one final worry: one might ask whether the final hypothesis alters our
explanation for association with the definite article based on hypothesis 3. To answer
this question, we must first find out whether adding the P-alternatives of JtheKo to its
focus alternatives really adds any new alternatives to JtheK f . In fact, the addition of
the P-alternatives of JtheKo adds nothing to its focus alternative set, because there
are no linguistic expressions in English whose meanings are P-equivalent to JtheKo.
Then, JtheK f remains the same, and the final hypothesis can still be suitably applied
to association with the definite article.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, new evidence was provided for focus alternatives being more tightly
constrained than previously thought. Evidence came from contrastive negation,
specifically negation associating with presupposition triggers. It was observed that
when presupposition triggers associate with negation, their presuppositions can be
denied. When considering the presuppositional quantificational determiners the and
both, we saw that for both of these cases, there is always an existential inference
present even under negation (i.e., their first argument must be non-empty). We found
that we could predict this behavior by constraining focus alternatives to lexical items
which are either Strawson-equivalent or P-equivalent.
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